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In this paper, a view of non-compliance in practical healthcare is provided that identifies 
certain non-compliant behaviours as rational. This view of rational non-compliance is used to 
update a current form of doctor patient relationships with the aim of reducing non-
compliance. In addition to reforming one standard doctor patient relationship model, the 
normative implications of understanding non-compliance as a rational form of human 
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Non-Compliance in Healthcare: Understanding Non-compliance as 
a Mode of Rational Goal Attainment 
1.1 Identifying Predictors of Non-Compliant Behaviours: The Problem 
In practical healthcare, non-compliance occurs when patients do not follow the treatment 
recommendations of their healthcare providers. The problem of non-compliance has serious 
negative consequences for the healthcare system and for patients who exhibit non-compliant 
behaviours (Fogarty, 1997). The cost of non-compliance is both financial and personal. For 
example, the healthcare system in the United States spends an estimated forty-six billion 
dollars per year as a result of medical non-compliance, while patients who are non-compliant 
are stuck with the burden of additional costs for treatment, unnecessary illnesses, and may 
ultimately face death (Wong, 2005). Determining causes of non-compliance, however, has 
been exceedingly difficult because there have not yet been any reliably predictive indicators 
of non-compliant behaviour. Approximately two hundred variables have been examined over 
a thirty-year period, and not one has proved to be predictive of non-compliance (Vermeire et 
al, 2001). Instead, non-compliance has been shown to result from many interacting variables 
and this complexity makes non-compliance a difficult problem to resolve (Ibid). Despite 
these difficulties, because non-compliance is a problem with such serious consequences, we 
need to keep looking for a solution.  
My contention is that sorting out different types of non-compliant behaviours will point 
to a thread of unity among cases of what I will call rational non-compliance, and that 
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identifying this thread can help to reduce the rate of incidence of non-compliance in the 
future. What I argue has not yet been investigated in the literature on non-compliance is the 
relationship between compliance and value with the aim of revising doctor-patient 
relationships in light of rational patient values.  I intend to make my case by adding to the 
traditional intentional/unintentional distinction in non-compliance literature, rational and 
irrational forms of intentional and unintentional non-compliance. Once I have established the 
link between rationality and non-compliance, I will subject rational intentional non-
compliance to analysis to identify its ultimate cause.  Understanding the underlying cause of 
rational intentional non-compliance can aid in updating shared decision-making model of 
doctor patient relationships to increase compliance in healthcare.  
Improving rates of medical compliance is difficult because identifying the causes of non-
compliance is too great a task and likely requires a time-consuming case-by-case analysis.  
Still, much work has gone into trying to predict non-compliant behaviours by examining the 
so-called causes of non-compliance (Bissell et al, 2004, Vermeire et al, 2001, Trostle, 1988, 
Davis, 1967).  Non-compliance in the domain of healthcare is especially problematic because 
of the costs and strains that it puts on healthcare system as well as the individual costs to 
patients.  For example, noncompliance is commonly estimated to result in 125,000 deaths 
each year.  Roughly one-quarter of nursing home admissions and 10 percent of admissions to 
acute care hospitals occur because of noncompliance (Wong, 2005).  Together, the physical 
consequences in combination with the estimated forty-six billion dollars in extra spending by 
the United States government make non-compliance a costly problem. These costs are 
staggering, not just in terms of dollars, but also in terms of adverse patient consequences.  
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However, while the aim of improving rates of compliance has been popularized in recent 
years it has nonetheless proven to be unsuccessful (Wong, 2005, Trostle, 1988). Furthermore, 
the popularization of the problem has led to a few post-modernist critiques of non-
compliance that hinder progress towards a resolution.  
 James Trostle in 1988 and others (Mykhalovskiy, 2001) have argued that the reason 
the problem of non-compliance has been so difficult to resolve is because it has not been 
properly understood. Trostles critique of non-compliance is based on the following view of 
the problem: Traditionally, non-compliance has been understood as a failing on the part of 
patients to follow the recommendations of their doctors.  Built in to this understanding are a 
couple assumptions:  
1. That the doctor knows best for the patient, and  
2. That patients do not have values that surpass, or are on par with their value of  
good health.   
Thus, application of the terms compliance and non-compliance have traditionally relied 
solely on doctors expectations and demands, in turn denying patient autonomy.  As such, 
there have been many contemporary critiques of non-compliance research and reduction 
aiming to emphasize the role of the patient and patient expectations in the healthcare setting, 
of which Trostles is one. It has been argued that,  the popularity of compliance and the 
uncertainty over its determinants can be understood if compliance is analyzed as an ideology 
that assumes and justifies physician authority (Trostle, 1988). This post-modernist view of 
non-compliance is problematic, however, in that it does not tackle the actual physical 
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consequences of non-compliance, short of saying they do not exist. The physical 
consequences of non-compliance, though, have been shown to often be dire and may include 
fatality. In other words, non-compliance is actually troublesome because non-compliant 
behaviours can result in severe physical and financial consequences felt by both the patient 
and the healthcare system.  
The postmodernist criticism of non-compliance is severely misguided. Non-compliance 
occurs in the context of healthcare and has real practical consequences, which have been 
detailed above. Reducing the problem of non-compliance to power differentials between 
individuals denies the possibility of practical concern in health and will make a resolution of, 
what is obviously a practical problem, impossible. In short, the postmodernist critique is 
problematic because it denies that non-compliance is actually a problem, instead suggesting 
that it is an ideology. The postmodernist critique is also unethical because it makes a 
resolution of a serious problem impossible by denying the practical component of decisions 
in healthcare.  
1.2 What is Non-compliance?  
Non-compliance, in the field of medicine, is the occurrence of not following the 
recommendations of doctors and health-care providers.   Thus, compliance can be said to 
exist when the patient carries out his doctors orders with regard to the medical regimen and 
conversely, does not exist when patients do not carry out their doctors orders (Davis, 1967).   
As such, rates of both compliance and non-compliance are determined by physician 
standards and recommendations. 
 
 5
1.3 Identifying Two Types of Non-Compliant Behaviour: Intentional and 
Unintentional Non-Compliance  
In this section I will describe the traditional intentional/unintentional distinction in non-
compliance literature. This distinction is important, but I will argue that these distinctions 
alone are inadequate and can be made more relevant by linking intentional and unintentional 
non-compliant behaviours to human rationality.  
Non-compliance can be either intentional or unintentional (Wroe, 2002).  Intentional non-
compliance refers to the act of consciously acting against the recommendations of a 
healthcare provider, while unintentional non-compliance tends to result from forgetfulness.  
Working from the starting point of the intentional distinction of non-compliance provides the 
groundwork for an understanding of rational intentional non-compliance, which I will later 
argue can be largely overcome.  
Forgetfulness tends to be a problem when medication regimens are either complex, or 
repetitive (Wong, 2005).  With respect to oral contraception, non-compliance rates are 
generally quite high with women often citing forgetfulness as the primary cause of their non-
compliant behaviour (Burke and Blumenthal, 2001).  Forgetting to attend to oral 
contraception is a good example of unintentional non-compliance because it represents a 
repetitive medical regimen that can result in undesirable consequences; unwanted 
pregnancies, for example. Unintentional compliance is a large part of the overall problem of 
non-compliance. However, while unintentional non-compliance is a serious and important 
issue in practical healthcare, my focus will be on intentional non-compliance.  My aim is to 
argue that linking intentional non-compliant behaviours to rationality will help to identify an 
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underlying predictor of non-compliance, which, in turn, may suggest a way of improving 
rates of compliance. My suggestion is that these distinctions, intentional and unintentional, 
cannot paint a full picture of the problem of non-compliance but rather lay the groundwork 
for a productive resolution. In contrast, I will show by use of empirical evidence that 
intentional non-compliance is strongly linked to human rationality because it is a purposive 
act that is goal directed and based on beliefs about treatment regimens or about spirituality, 
freedom, familial relations, etc. However, while some have explored the link between 
rationality and non-compliance the question of resolution has yet remained an open one.  I 
will argue why the link between rationality and intentional non-compliance is important and 
how it illuminates a predictive cause of non-compliant behaviour, which can be tackled via 
emotional consensus within the framework of shared decision-making. 
1.4 Non-Compliance and Human Rationality: 
Intentional non-compliance occurs when patients willfully act contrary to the 
recommendations of their healthcare providers.  There are two reasons why patients might do 
this: 1. if patients have reason to believe that they know better than their doctors, and 2. if 
patients consciously decide that taking care of their health will compromise other rational 
goals.   Goal attainment is the subject of human rationality, and thus the latter cause of 
intentional non-compliance might often represent a form of reasoned decision-making. In 
order to make this point more clear, I will briefly outline what constitutes rationality and then 
provide a couple of patient examples highlighting what, I believe, is happening when patients 
are being rationally non-compliant. Additionally, I will argue that rational non-compliance 
occurs predominantly as a result of values that take priority over the value of wellbeing.  One 
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assumption about value is built into this argument; there are competing values and these 
values will be taken as rational  hence, rational non-compliance. Identifying which values 
in particular will cause rational intentional non-compliance is a huge endeavour, however as I 
will show much ground can be covered by knowing that discrepancies between doctor and 
patient valuations can cause a specific form of non-compliance. 
  Human rationality has two primary aspects. One aspect of rationality is concerned 
with the rationality of actions and is practical rationality. The other aspect of rationality is 
concerned with beliefs and values, and it is termed theoretical rationality. Following Audi 
and Brandt, my position is that these two components work together. In other words,  
Theoretical rationality aims at arriving at true belief and 
avoiding false belief, nonhaphazardly.  Practical rationality, to 
which theoretical rationality is an important aid, aims at getting 
what one wants, in accordance with ones beliefs about what 
one can get and how one can get it[Furthermore,] [w]e 
cannot succeed as practical beings in the absence of theoretical 
rationality (Ludwig, 2004, Audi, 2004). 
The explanatory force of any framework of rationality is determined by how well it 
prescribes human behaviours that fall within these two spheres of rationality.  Essentially, 
the degree to which someone is rational depends on the degree to which his attitudes exhibit 
patterns at and across times appropriate for ideal pursuit of his theoretical and practical 
goals (Audi, 2004).  Conversely, irrationality occurs when one compromises the pursuit of 
his or her theoretical and practical goals.  Thus, some examples of irrationality include 
wishful thinking, believing something because you want it to be true arbitrary belief 
formation [and] believing for no good reason (Ibid).  While my aim is not to provide a 
model of rationality, an important characteristic of one is that it is general. Both rationality 
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and irrationality must be characterized within a model of rationality and for that model to 
have explanatory force it must be general.  Generality is an advantageous criterion for 
models of rationality because it will apply to actions and beliefs in a variety of different, 
lived, contexts.  One such context is the sphere of healthcare.  
Decisions about medical compliance occur in a context so that decisions about medical 
compliance are made at the intersection of variable factors including interpersonal relations, 
financial considerations, etc and these factors stem from values that are shared across 
different patient populations. As I will show, discrepancies between doctors and patients 
values can predict rational intentional non-compliance and play an important part in the 
resolution of rational intentional non-compliance. Patient values that cause non-compliant 
behaviours can sometimes be rational. Jenny Donovan makes a similar point, [patients] 
weigh up the costs and benefits of taking particular medications as they perceive them within 
the contexts and constraints of their everyday lives and needs, and in so doing may risk their 
health in the face of having to compromise other goals (Donovan, 1992).  
Prima facie, it may seem that every instance of non-compliance is irrational because health 
is the most basic component of life upon which all other goal directed actions depend. Thus, 
it seems as though non-compliant behaviours are ultimately irrational because they 
potentially compromise the fulfillment of any, and all other goals. However, it may be 
rational not to comply with the prescriptions of a doctor if patients seeking treatment do a 
cost-benefit analysis of the cost of their treatment vs. the benefit of living a satisfactory life 
structured on their system of values.   Patients who then decide to forego treatment in order 
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to live a more satisfying, though possibly shorter, life might be identified as being rationally 
non-compliant (Donovan, 1992).    
In order to make this point more clearly I will provide two empirical case studies and a 
hypothetical example that represent the sort of rational cost-benefit analysis I am talking 
about.   
1.5 Case Studies  
1.5.1 Harold 
A study into causes of non-compliance in children and adolescents following renal 
transplantation conducted by Georg Wolff et al noted that eighty-five patients exhibited non-
compliant behaviours1. Of those eighty-five, thirty-one percent indicated that the reason for 
their non-compliant behaviour was the intrusiveness of the treatment into their family lives, 
while fifteen percent communicated that either they, or their families, did not believe the 
seriousness of their disease.  Wolff et al present the following case: 
A 13-year-old patient [Harold] stopped taking Cyclosporin A 
after he became absolutely desperate about his parents 
imminent separation, which he wanted to prevent; his non-
compliance was like an emergency call so that he could at least 
have his parents together at his hospital bedside (Wolff et al, 
1998). 
Harold weighs the cost of his non-compliance -possible kidney failure/death - against his 
benefit -desire of having his family together - and intentionally acts out against his doctors 
recommendations in order to attain the goal of family togetherness. Harolds practically 
rational action is not complying in order to get his family together, while his theoretically 
 
 10
rational action is the belief that becoming more sick would bring his parents together at his 
bedside.  
1.5.2 George 
Next, imagine a patient, George, who has suffered from a now cured/remitted cancer of 
type A in the past.   George is then diagnosed with cancer of type B, which has a fatality rate 
of eighty-five percent.    Believing that he is going to die, George may choose a shorter life 
without the treatment that prior experience has shown him to be very aggressive and 
upsetting.  This type of cost-benefit analysis may take into considerations the desires of his 
family  - for example, spouse, children, parents - and the financial costs of treatment, as well 
as the personal desire to avoid pain and discomfort associated with the treatment. This 
hypothetical, but not unrealistic, situation illustrates that medical decisions are not made in 
isolation and that many variables may contribute to compliance decisions.   The practical 
goal of this hypothetical patient may be to spend the most time with loved ones, a goal more 
easily attained outside of a hospital or other treatment facility.    The theoretical goal of this 
hypothetical patient is to employ the belief that a shorter life at home with family is more 
satisfying than a longer life in the hospital.    Both of these goals are satisfied in our 
hypothetical circumstance, and so the prior example resembles a case where it is perfectly 
rational to not comply with the recommendations of ones doctor.     
1.5.3 Margaret 
An alternate view is that, in a medical context, patients' perceptions of threats to their 
freedom or control may induce noncompliance (Fogarty, 1997). In other words, patients 
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might perceive the recommendations of their doctors as threats to their freedom or personal 
control and so either subtly or overtly refuse to co-operate with a medical treatment (Ibid). 
Imagine a patient, Margaret, who has a family history of lung cancer, but who continues to 
smoke against the recommendations of her doctor. Margaret believes that it is her right to 
choose to smoke, and that she should be afforded that freedom but her doctor has told her 
that he will refuse treatment if she continues to smoke. Alison Pilnick and Tim Coleman have 
shown that this type of scenario does in fact occur frequently. They argue that,  
Despite evidence from other areas of health care that advice is 
most effective when it is personalised, and despite GPs 
expressed views that a preferred way of topicalising smoking is 
to make links to a patients current medical problems, this is 
not generally the case in these consultations. Linking smoking 
to current problems commonly results in explicit resistance 
from patients of a kind that is rarely seen in other medical 
consultations (Pilnick and Coleman, 2003).  
The case of Margaret is a hypothetical one based on generalized empirical data. It is not 
meant as a case to test intuition, but rather as a general representation of actual phenomena. 
The case presents a situation in which Margaret may feel that her freedom, which she values, 
is being threatened. Margaret may then actively decide to not comply with her doctors 
recommendations as a reaction to that threat. In this case, Margaret has decided that, at least 
temporarily, it is okay to undermine the value of her health to maintain her personal freedom.  
In this case, maintaining personal freedom is a practical goal, and Margarets belief that 
personal freedom is valuable is related to theoretical rationality. Margaret is rational in 
pursuing her goals by ignoring the recommendations of her doctor if she believes that so 
doing will compromise attaining both her theoretical and practical goals.  
 
 12
1.6 Case Reviews 
Given a review of the previous cases of George and Margaret and Harold, it is evident that 
all three were rational in their intentional non-compliant behaviours toward their treatment 
plans. In Georges case, he had decided to forego treatment in order to spend valuable time at 
home with his family despite knowing that his life would be shorter than it otherwise could 
be. George placed a higher value on his time spent with his family than his overall health, 
and decided that that value gave him reason enough to be non-compliant. Similarly, Harold, 
in an attempt to bring his family back together, acted out against his doctor intentionally  
valuing their time together. In Margarets case, she had decided to not follow a treatment 
recommendation in order to maintain her sense of personal freedom despite knowing that her 
life might be shorter than it otherwise could be. Margaret placed a higher value on her 
personal freedom than her overall health, and decided that that value gave her reason enough 
to be non-compliant. Rationality is judged relative to practical and theoretical goal 
attainment, and these goals are founded on patient values. When doctors and patients values 
conflict, intentional non-compliance will occur. Thus, employing a co-operative model of 
decision-making that allows doctors and patients to share values may help to reduce non-
compliance.  
I have provided three cases of intentional non-compliance to show that non-compliance 
can be understood as a goal directed behaviour. At the root of this behaviour are underlying 
patient values that conflict with the value of health, and so can be seen as predictors of 
rational non-compliance. In brief, different patient populations will have non-compliant 
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patients who make a rational decision not to comply with their doctors recommendations, 
and their values will contribute to making these decisions.  
One important question is brought to light by my analysis  how can jeopardizing ones 
health be seen as rational goal directed behaviour?  In other words, some might object that 
patients with inconsistent goals are fundamentally irrational.  In response to this question, I 
would respond by arguing that rationality is not concerned with consistency in goals and 
beliefs, but rather is concerned with determining which goals to pursue given necessary time 
constraints. Essentially, people always have inconsistent goals and beliefs and are necessarily 
unable to make these goals and beliefs consistent given time constraints. For example, I want 
to play for the WNBA but I also want to finish my Masters degree in philosophy and I am 
unable to pursue these goals simultaneously because honing my basketball skills would take 
many years. Thus, while both goals are relevant they are inconsistent. Rationality, instead, 
allows individuals to balance their time relative to their goals. Thus, it may sometimes be 
rational to pursue a course of action that is detrimental to ones health if the value of health is 
surpassed by another value at one point in time (Thagard, 2006).   
I have so far shown that there is in fact a link between rationality and intentional non-
compliance, but have only so far suggested why this link is relevant or important to 
improving rates of compliance. That is, pushing the link between rational goal-directed 
actions and non-compliance reveals shared patient values and reduces the magnitude of the 
problem by breaking general non-compliance down into a more specific form.  
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The connection between intentional non-compliance and rationality is prima facie obvious 
because non-compliance refers to behaviour, or action (practical rationality), that results from 
belief formation (theoretical rationality). Understanding non-compliance solely in terms of 
intentional and unintentional action is problematic because these two categories are both 
broad and vague. Intentional actions are purposive and unintentional actions are not. This 
distinction alone is insufficient for understanding the problem of non-compliance because 
both purposive and non-purposive actions can have many causes, and moving beyond these 
categories to questions of why patients would act purposively or non-purposively may be 
fruitful. Enjoining the discussion of non-compliance to an understanding of rationality will 
be helpful in making the categories of non-compliant behaviours more manageable by 
constraining the discussion to purposive and rational goal-directed behaviour. While this 
seems like a subtle adjustment, I will show that the impact is great.  
1.7 Looking Ahead 
 The more specific rational intentional non-compliance has a predictive cause, I have 
argued, that is identifiable. I intend to move on to suggest a possible resolution of rational 
intentional non-compliance by incorporating the notion of emotional consensus for value 
sharing into a shared decision-making model of doctor patient relationships. This move is 
largely uncontroversial, as many others have suggested improved doctor patient relationships 
and better communication between doctor and patient as a possible solution to the problem of 
non-compliance. In the next section I will briefly detail the three traditional models of doctor 
patient relationships, and some suggestions made to reduce non-compliance within these 
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models. Finally, I will identify why the shared decision-making model is best suited to 





Non-Compliance in Context 
In the first chapter I identified the link between rationality and intentional non-compliance. 
This link points to the significance of patient values that I will argue represent a part of the 
resolution of one type of non-compliance. In this second chapter I will move on to discuss 
the context of non-compliance, as well as three existing models of doctor-patient 
relationships.  
The type of non-compliant behaviour that I am interested in is the type that occurs within 
the context of healthcare be it public or private. As such, non-compliance occurs at the 
junction of the relationship between doctor and patient and it occurs for a number of reasons, 
which, it has been shown, are largely indeterminate. However, because the site of non-
compliant behaviours is known  the relationship between doctor and patient  that is a 
reasonable place to start addressing the problem.  
There are three principal forms of relationships between doctors and their patients. Two of 
these three forms have been employed in the health industry with varying degrees of 
popularity over the years, while one is just now increasing in popularity (Bisselll et al, 2004). 
The newest model of doctor-patient relationships has been touted as being a possible solution 
to the problem of non-compliance as well as a response to the inadequacies of the other two 
models. As such, it is of interest to my project of identifying a solution to a particular form of 
non-compliance. My goal in this chapter is to give a brief description of each of these three 
forms of doctor patient relationships while arguing why I think that improvements to the 
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third model  the shared decision-making model - will be the most practically useful tool for 
responding to non-compliant patients.  
2.1 Paternalism   
Paternalism, in a medical context, occurs when doctors make decisions for their patients 
(Whitney et al, 2003, C. Charles et al, 1999, Parsons, 1951, Bloom, 1963). A paternalistic 
relationship between doctors and their patients is analogous to a relationship between parents 
and their children.  In paternalistic doctor-patient relationships, the doctor assumes the 
dominant role while patients, in turn, assume a passive role accepting treatment plans 
prescribed by their health-care provider (C. Charles et al, 1999). Similarly, in a family 
setting, the parent assumes the dominant role while children, in turn; assume a passive role 
accepting the orders of their parents. Children who obey their parents tend to do so because 
they believe that their parents are acting in their best interest (Wright, 1987). Similarly, the 
success of paternalistic relationships is built on the notion of doctor beneficence (Parsons, 
1951). So that,  
Underlyingdeference to professional authority [are] a 
[number] of assumptions. Firstfor most illnesses, a single 
best treatment existed and that physicians generally would be 
well versed in the most current and valid clinical thinking. 
Second, physicians would not only know the best treatments 
available, they would consistently apply this information when 
selecting treatments for their own patients. Third, because of 
their expertise and experience physicians were in the best 
position to evaluate tradeoffs between different treatments and 
to make treatment decision. Fourth, because of their 
professional concern for the welfare of their patients, 
physicians had a legitimate investment in each treatment 
decision (C. Charles et al, 1999).  
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In other words, within a paternalistic framework doctors choose a treatment plan that they 
believe is in the best interest of their patients and this treatment plan represents the best of 
many possible options. Within the paternalistic framework, the flow of information between 
doctors and patients is one directional, with doctors providing medical information to their 
patients. Furthermore, physicians are the sole deliberators, deciding which available 
treatment plan would be best for their patients. Paternalism is largely unpopular now and the 
reasons for its decline in popularity are well documented so I will not discuss them here (see 
Wright, 1987, C. Charles et al, 1992). Importantly however, the decline of paternalism led to 
the rise of the informed decision model.  
2.2 Informed Decision Model 
Following the decline of paternalism, patient participation in medical decision-making was 
encouraged as a way to regain autonomy and disambiguate patient interests (Falkum et al, 
2001, Wright, 1987). A new model of doctor-patient relationships was popularized, and 
remains popular in North American healthcare systems. This model is the informed decision 
model of medical decision-making. The informed decision model relies on information 
sharing. That is, the doctor shares information with the patient about treatments and 
outcomes of treatments and the patient either agrees to, or withholds, consent to a particular 
treatment. So, like the paternalist model the flow of information in the informed decision 
model is one directional. The type of information that doctors share with their patients in this 
model is medical information alone (Wirtz et al, 2006). Very roughly,  
In the informed modelthe patient proceeds through the 
deliberation and decision making process on her own. The 
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physicians role is limited to providing medical/scientific 
information that will enable her to make an informed decision. 
Underlying this model are two assumptions. The first is that as 
long as patients possess current scientific information on 
treatment benefits and risks, they will be able to make the best 
decision for themselves. The second is that physicians should 
not have an investment in the decision-making process or in the 
decision made (C. Charles et al, 1999).  
In other words, patients are the sole deliberators in the informed decision model, and patients 
alone decide on which treatment to implement (Ibid).  This model is in direct contrast to 
paternalism where doctors deliberate on the best treatment plans, and then make a final 
decision for the patient about which to implement.  
Informed decision, as the name suggests, relies on the transfer of information. The 
direction of this information transfer is from doctor to patient and consists solely in medical 
information (C. Charles et al, 1999). Patients become informed in the language of treatment 
regimens as well as scientific and medical advances in health care, and then make decisions 
regarding treatment from this informed standpoint. The informed decision model was 
developed in response to paternalism, and as a response to the limiting of patient autonomy 
in paternalistic relationships between doctors and their patients.  
2.3 Shared Decision-Making: 
The final model of doctor-patient relationships is the shared decision-making model. Within 
the context of a shared decision-making model, doctors and patients make decisions about 
treatment plans together. Four criteria are satisfied in this model: 




2. Both the physician and patient share information with each other. 
3. Both the physician and the patient take steps to participate in the decision-making 
process by expressing treatment preferences. 
4. A treatment decision is made and both the physician and patient agree on the 
treatment to implement.  (C. Charles et al, 1999).  
Notably, the most important characteristic of this model that sets it apart from the other 
two is that it provides a dynamic view of treatment decision-making by recognizing that the 
approach adopted at the outset of any given physician/patient encounter may change during 
the course of that encounter (Ibid). Shared decision-making models allow for flexibility in 
treatment plans given new information (either from the patient or from the doctor) and this is 
desirous, particularly if patients know at the outset that the course of their treatment plans 
depend on the information they share. Furthermore, because the shared decision-making 
models of doctor-patient relationships allow for a dynamic relationship and dynamic 
treatment plan it is more psychologically plausible; a point that will come up again in the 
third chapter. This is one of the primary benefits of the shared decision-making model that 
sets it apart from the other two.  In the shared decision-making model, the flow of 
information is two-way with doctors and their patients sharing relevant information. 
Additionally, both doctors and their patients deliberate and decide on the best treatment plan 
to implement. In contrast to paternalism the shared decision-making model increases patient 
autonomy and encourages doctor-patient dialogue, and so is, in some ways similar to the 
informed decision model though in important ways is different. 
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2.4 How does the shared decision-making model differ from the informed 
decision model?  
The shared decision-making model, like the informed decision model, is in direct contrast 
to a paternalist model of doctor-patient relationships. There are, however, important 
differences between these two models that have, in the past, been overlooked. In fact, these 
two labels [informed consent and shared decision-making] have often been used 
interchangeably to describe quite different types of interaction between physician and patient 
in treatment decision-making (C. Charles et al, 1999). Furthermore, Because informed 
consent and shared decision making can serve the same purposeto enhance the patients 
control over his or her medical careit is natural to ask whether they are, or should be, the 
same process, as some commentators have asserted (Whitney et al, 2003). The shared 
decision-making model (also called the collegial model and the co-operative model of 
medical decision-making) is, in fact, similar to the informed consent model, though there are 
subtle differences of important consequence. For one, in the context of a shared decision-
making relationship both the doctor and the patient share the duty of determining a treatment 
plan together as opposed to the patient being the sole deliberator and decision maker in the 
informed decision model. For two, the type of information that is shared differs. Patients who 
make decisions in an informed model make decisions based solely on medical information, 
whereas patients who make decisions in a shared decision-making model share all relevant 
medical and personal information (C. Charles et al, 1999). 
 In brief, in the informed model, doctors share information and options with patients and 
patients agree to a treatment plan prescribed by the doctor. Patients are given information and 
 
 22
can choose to comply or not. Sharing information with patients opens a dialogue between 
doctor and patient, but this dialogue tends to be one-directional. In other words, patients do 
not develop treatment plans with their doctors and they do not share information with their 
doctors, outside of relevant medical histories. These are the differences between the informed 
model and the shared decision-making model that are of important consequence. A simple 
chart, below, illustrates the significant differences between all three models.  
 Information 
Exchange 


















































Table 1.1 Chart of doctor patient relationship models, adapted from C. Charles et al, 1999.  
 
2.5 Moving towards improvement 
I have provided a description of each of the three most popular forms of doctor-patient 
relationships. This overview is meant to motivate a discussion of how each relate to the 
problem of non-compliance, and assess whether one of these models is better suited than the 
others to help resolve the problem of non-compliance. Like others, I will argue that adopting 
a shared decision-making model into our healthcare systems is a viable solution to one 
particular type of non-compliant behaviour that I have identified as rational-intentional non-
compliance (Donovan et al, 1992 C. Charles et al, 1999, Whitney et al, 2003, Bissell et al, 
2004). However, I think that the shared decision-making model can be improved by 
understanding what some of the causes of rational-intentional non-compliance are. As a 
model of doctor-patient relationships, the shared decision-making model is the most useful. 
However, as a tool to resolve the problem of non-compliance it is substantially unequipped. 
This is due in large part to the complexity of the problem, and not due to any shortcomings of 
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the model itself. The shared decision-making model is unequipped to handle the problem of 
non-compliance in general, but with some adjustments will be sufficiently improved to 
handle the problem of rational intentional non-compliance.   
To make my case, I will show why paternalism and the informed decision model of 
doctor-patient relationships cannot adequately resolve the problem of non-compliance, and 
may, in fact, contribute to the overall problem. I will further show that while adopting a 
shared decision-making model may represent the best form of doctor patient relations, some 
improvements can be made to the model aimed specifically at resolving the problem of 
rational intentional non-compliance. In short, I will argue that a shared decision-making 
model represents the best available option for resolving rational intentional non-compliance 
within the context of practical healthcare.  
2.6 Doctor Patient Relationships and the Problem of Non-Compliance 
Previous suggestions on how to reduce the problem of non-compliance have included, but 
have not been limited to, improving existing models of doctor-patient relationships. These 
improvements have been suggested, but arguments about how to make these improvements 
have not been made explicit (Donovan, 1992).  Above, I briefly sketched out the criteria of 
three traditional models of doctor patient relationships: paternalism, informed decision, and 
shared decision-making. Furthermore, I have shown how each of these models might be used 
to tackle the problem of non-compliance. In the paragraphs that follow, I will show why 
some suggested improvements to the three traditional models of doctor patient relationships 
have not helped to resolve the problem of non-compliance. Typically, suggested 
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improvements to doctor patient relationships include increased communication and increased 
patient involvement (Donovan, 1992). In Jenny Donovans words,  
The key to improving rates of compliance, (although 
effectively doing away with the concept), is the development of 
active, co-operative relationships between patients and doctors. 
For this to be successful, doctors will need to recognise 
patients decision-making abilities, to try to understand 
patients needs and constraints, and to work with patients in the 
development of treatment regimes. For their part, patients will 
need to make more explicit their needs and expectations, and 
particularly how they reach their decisions about 
treatmentsThe solution to the waste of resources inherent in 
non-compliance lies not in attempting to increase patient 
compliance per se, but in the development of more open, co-
operative doctor-patient relationships. (Donovan, 1992). 
While Donovans ideas represent viable choices, they are at this time vague suggestions that 
do not address the causes of non-compliance.  
2.6.1 Paternalism and Non-Compliance 
A paternalistic model of doctor patient relationships may induce non-compliant behaviours if 
patients feel as if their personal freedom is somehow being threatened by the relationships 
they have with their doctors. Built into the paternalistic model is an asymmetry in power that 
denies patients autonomy. As such, non-compliance occurs within the paternalistic model 
when patients fail to meet the recommendations of their doctors who act from a position of 
authority, and this alone may be enough to cause patients to rationally intentionally be non-
compliant. Jeanne Fogarty makes a similar point that psychological reactance against a 
perceived threat to personal freedom may induce non-compliant behaviours. Fogarty says, 
As long as providers seek to maintain the present distribution of power, they will continue 
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to run headlong into what patients perceive to be their freedom with regard to health 
management and the door to reactance-induced non-compliance will remain open. (Fogarty, 
1997). Furthermore, the paternalistic model cannot accommodate either of the previous 
suggestions to improve models of doctor patient relationships  increased communication 
and increased patient involvement - without resembling one of the other two models. As 
such, there is no point in implementing these suggestions in a paternalistic framework 
because it would no longer be a paternalistic framework. If the paternalistic framework 
cannot accommodate suggestions to combat the problem of non-compliance, then the other 
two models represent better options to increase patient compliance. 
2.6.2 Informed Decision-Making and Non-Compliance 
Unlike the paternalistic model, the informed decision model can accommodate the previous 
suggestions to improve models of doctor patient relationships. Communication between 
doctors and patients can be increased, but the only information shared will be relevant 
medical information.  Increased communication can occur if doctors share information about 
new treatment options with their patients, for example. The informed decision-making model 
will, however, suffer from the problem of disclosure, where the information that doctors 
provide their patients is subject to their own biases and thus may not accurately reflect every 
option available to the patient, which may cause the model to collapse into a weak 
paternalistic model. Furthermore, doctors and patients can develop a better rapport through 
increased communication, but within the theoretical framework of the informed decision-
making model the only information that can be communicated is medical information. This 
exchange does not leave open the possibility of sharing values, which is a large part of the 
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resolution of the problem of rational intentional non-compliance. While the informed 
decision model represents a more viable option than paternalism for decreasing non-
compliance in practical healthcare, a better model still exists.  
2.6.3 Shared Decision-Making and Non-Compliance 
The shared decision-making model shares with the informed decision-making model the 
problem of disclosure; however it has the benefit of allowing any type of communication 
relevant to the treatment regimen, including patient values. Open two-way communication 
between doctors and their patients, as well as patient involvement are inherent components of 
the theoretical framework of shared decision-making in a health setting. Within the shared 
decision-making model any type of information that is relevant to treatment can be shared, 
including patient values that exist outside of a medical context. Rational intentional non-
compliance occurs when doctors and patients have values and goals that conflict, and so 
sharing these values can work to reduce non-compliant behaviours. As such, the shared 
decision-making model represents the best option for implementing a resolution to the 
problem of rational intentional non-compliance. However, while this model is a good tool 
with which to address the problem of non-compliance, it can still be improved. Furthermore, 
there are some problems relevant to the problem of non-compliance that all three models 
share.  
2.7 Non-Compliance within a Theoretical Framework 
Suggested improvements to doctor patient relationships as a way to reduce non-
compliant behaviour have traditionally failed for a number of reasons. The most basic 
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problem with the view that improving doctor patient relations will reduce non-compliance is 
that the idea has been presented to combat the problem of non-compliance without 
identifying what causes non-compliance; because identifying causes of non-compliance in 
general has proven to be very difficult. In short, the suggestion to improve doctor patient 
relationships fails because it is based on a superficial understanding of non-compliance. 
Thus, any suggested improvements to doctor-patient relationships are not able to capture the 
complexity of the overall problem. Instead what is needed is a revised look at the problem 
with the aim of improving doctor-patient relations. Furthermore, the terms of improvement 
are often vaguely defined.  Many define improvement in terms of improved communication 
between doctor and patient but this is insufficient because it does not suggest anything about 
the form of communication, or what is meant by improved communication. Simple 
communication of concerns on both the part of the doctor and the part of the patient will not 
resolve non-compliance because non-compliance, in general, is a hugely complex problem. 
Additionally, problems of patient/doctor biases as well as a problem with disclosure will 
persist.  
Two of the three principal models of doctor-patient relations - paternalism and the 
informed decision model - are especially plagued by these concerns, while one  the shared 
decision-making model - is designed in such a way as to include the criterion of open lines of 
communication between doctor and patient. This is a start, but it is not the full story.  Others 
have argued that implementing a shared decision-making model in the health system will on 
its own reduce the degree to which patients are non-compliant, but my view is that the model 
can be further improved, and offer a way to make improvements to the shared decision-
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making model in what follows. My project differs from others because I aim at defining 
exactly how to improve one doctor-patient relationship model relative to a very specific type 




Decision Making in Practical Healthcare 
3.1 Introduction 
In the last chapter I provided an overview of the three principal models of doctor-patient 
relationships. Of these three models, I argued that one was well equipped to tackle the 
problem of non-compliance but could benefit from some improvements other than those 
already suggested. My goal in this chapter is to show that by focusing on a specific form of 
non-compliance, the rate of occurrence can be reduced by improving a shared decision-
making model of doctor patient relations. My suggestion for improvement is to incorporate 
the idea of emotional consensus for value sharing. I will argue that overcoming rational 
intentional non-compliance happens by exchanging and sharing values. In the following 
paragraphs I will provide an overview of two theories of decision-making with the aim of 
determining how best to share and exchange values in a medical context.  
Some values will be shared and others will conflict.  At the most basic level, doctors 
and patients will share the value of health. Doctors value the health of their patients above all 
else, which is, of course, their job. Patients also value their health, but may have values that 
surpass the value of health at some point in time. As I have shown, pursuing goals that are 
detrimental to health can sometimes be rational. While identifying particular values that give 
rise to rational intentional non-compliance is beyond the scope of this paper, knowing that 
conflicting values between doctors and patients gives rise to rational non-compliant 
behaviour allows for significant progress towards a resolution. A resolution to the problem of 
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rational intentional non-compliance will require developing a framework that helps doctors 
and patients to share values.  This framework is the shared decision-making model of doctor 
patient relations that incorporates the concept of emotional consensus.  
3.2 Decision-making, the Traditional View 
Decision-making has traditionally been conceived of as a largely rational process. 
Underlying this analysis is the view that decision-making performs a pragmatic function. The 
function of decision-making has  
Been stated traditionally by assuming that the [decider] desires to obtain a 
maximum of utility or satisfaction [and] the individual who attempts to 
obtain these respective maxima is also said to act rationally (VonNeumann, 
and Morgenstern, 1957).  
In short, individuals who aim to maximize utility or satisfaction are rational, in the case of 
economics, consumers, and in the case of practical healthcare, patients.  
The above view has been popularized in economics and has also been influential in 
philosophy. A rough and ready account of the economic view of preferences is that the best 
way of understanding peoples preferences is to understand preferences as the result of 
rational belief formation. The economic view of decision-making is also being applied in the 
context of practical healthcare. Thus, analyzing the healthcare system through the lens of this 
economic account reveals that patient preferences, like consumer preferences, are rational 
and they are given. That is, patients behaviour will reveal what their preferences are and 
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these preferences, if they aim at maximizing satisfaction and utility, reflect rational choices 
that cannot be contested.  
The economic view of decision-making, however, does not take us very far with 
regards to resolving the problem of rational intentional non-compliance. First, within the 
context of practical healthcare patients can form false beliefs about their preferences and 
modes of preference satisfaction that can be dangerous (Hausman, 2006). Second, the 
traditional economic view does not allow for negotiation between doctors and patients of 
patient preferences. Finally, the psychological plausibility of the economic view of 
preferences and decision-making has been challenged (Hausman, 2006, Thagard and Kroon, 
2006). While the economic model of decision-making may explain certain behaviours in 
consumers, it is not well suited to explaining certain behaviours in patients. However, there 
exists a model of decision-making that is better suited to explaining the features of medical 
decision-making.  
3.3 Emotional Consensus 
An alternate view of decision-making that is gaining popularity in psychology is that 
decisions are inherently emotional (Thagard and Kroon, 2006, Damasio, 1994, Wagar and 
Thagard, 2004, Lerner and Keltner, 2000). This alternative explores the significance of 
emotional reactions to optional courses of actions. This alternate view is appealing because it 
reflects intuitions about the impact emotions have in our day-to day lives. This view suggests 
that decisions have a latent emotional component that is brought to light by the deciders 
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reactions towards or against represented options. Wagar and Thagard give the emotional, 
cognitive-affective, theory of decision-making expression in the following example, 
Some people like to make decisions by flipping a coin, after 
assigning one choice to heads and another to tails. The point is 
not to make the decision indicated by the flip but rather to see 
how they feel about the choice that the coin flip tells them to 
do. Flipping a coin is an effective way to find out their 
emotional reactions to various alternatives, indicating the 
emotional weight they attach to them (Wagar and Thagard, 
2004, p 67).  
In particular, decisions pertaining to individual health are likely to elicit highly emotional 
reactions because they are related to life and death concerns.  
In the case of individual decisions, decision-making is the result of aligning reason 
with emotional reactions. Theoretical and practical rationality will work together to present 
optional courses of action, and emotional reactions to each option  either positive or 
negative  will determine the deciders order of preferences. This is a very rough account of 
the decision-making process, which is, by no means, meant to be conclusive. Rather, this 
rough account of the individual decision making process is meant to lay the groundwork for a 
discussion of shared/group decisions and emotional consensus.  
Emotional consensus will occur only in a shared decision-making model of doctor-
patient relationships, as opposed to the other two traditional models, because the shared 
decision-making model is the only framework that allows for communication of information, 
and thus values, extending beyond the category of medical information. 
Thagard and Kroon present an account of the individual decision making process that 
identifies a link between preferences and emotion. In their words, preferences arise in favor 
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of options associated with strong positive emotions, and against options associated with 
strong negative emotions (Thagard and Kroon, 2006).  Every course of action is an option 
that is represented. Emotional responses are elicited by those representations. Emotional 
responses to available courses of action, in turn, form preferences in favour of one decision, 
against another and so on. So, while individual preferences arise when an available option is 
associated with either positive or negative emotion towards that option  either the individual 
will pursue the option represented or avoid it - decisions between two or more people require 
consensus on factual information as well as an emotional consensus or an approximation to 
emotional consensus.  Thus, group decisions are much more complex than decisions made at 
the individual level because they involve both competing degrees of knowledge, and 
competing preferences. When individuals come together to make a decision their preferences 
are often compromised when seeking consensus. 
3.4 Group Decision-making 
Group decisions occur when two or more people perceive representations in context. 
Representations are of available options, and together the group must decide whether to 
pursue an option, avoid an option, or reassess their options. The healthcare system presents 
three contexts for decision-making to occur. In a paternalistic framework, decisions are made 
by physicians and so are individual decisions, in the informed decision model, decisions are 
made by patients and are also individual decisions, in the shared decision-making model, the 
decision-making process is shared by the doctor and the patient and thus represents an 
instance of group decision-making. 
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Like individual decisions, group decisions have a cognitive component and an 
emotional component. Unlike individual decisions, group decisions require that factual and 
emotional consensus is met among participants. Exchanging factual information is relatively 
easy and can be done through the use of forceful argumentation either by analogy or appeal 
to expertise, etc. Consensus, in group decisions, occurs when all involved parties share the 
same cognitive information as well as the same or similar emotional values. In other words, 
group decision making will require attainment of a kind of emotional consensus in which 
members of the group share similar positive and negative feelings about different actions and 
goals (Thagard and Kroon, 2006). The elements of a decision that are agreed upon from a 
purely cognitive standpoint are most often shared verbally, while the elements of a shared 
decision that have an emotional component are shared through a more subtle emotional 
communication, which can take several forms (Ibid). The forms of emotional 
communication are social and include emotional contagion, altruism, empathy, means-end 
and analogical arguments (Ibid). Emotional communication is an important step towards 
emotional consensus. 
3.5 Types of Emotional communication 
3.5.1 Empathy 
 One important way of communicating the emotional status of representations is 
through empathy. Empathy will play a large role in the shared decision-making process. On 
the one hand, patients can recognize their doctors limitations. For example, doctors are 
limited in their ability to prescribe treatments outside the bounds of standardized ethical 
 
 36
guidelines, or in their ability to understand the rationality of opting out of treatments that may 
benefit patients health. On the other hand, doctors can recognize what may cause patients to 
willfully opt out of a treatment plan that seems promising or even one that is actually 
working. Empathy is best described as putting oneself in anothers shoes, however beneath 
this metaphor is a cognitive basis (See Carr et al, 2003). Detailing the cognitive basis of 
empathy is beyond the scope of this paper but an important thing to take from the literature 
on empathy is that empathy develops through an emotional education (Thagard, 2005).  
Empathy develops either as a by-product of a sound emotional education or as a part of 
emotional development, which lends support to the idea that decision-making is inherently 
emotional. So, the resolution of the problem of non-compliance is best understood within a 
framework of decision-making that takes into consideration the emotional component of 
decisions. 
3.5.2 Emotional contagion  
Emotional contagion is another form of emotional communication that is relevant to 
medical decision-making. Emotional contagion occurs when people catch emotions from 
other individuals. Emotional contagion occurs when individuals mimic the motions and facial 
expressions of other members of the group, this mimicry, in turn, generates a feedback that 
causes the emotional reactions being mimicked to result. In this sense, emotional reactions 
are passed on non-verbally and non-intentionally from individual to individual. (See Thagard 
and Kroon, 2006. Adapted from Hatfield, Cacioppo and Rapson, 1994). Emotional contagion 
is not purposefully communicated between individuals, but is rather an inherent feature of 
emotionally charged decisions. Enthusiasm, for example creates a sort of contagious 
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atmosphere. A criterion of emotional contagion is that it occurs in face to face meetings 
between individuals as at a meeting between a doctor and patient (Ibid).  
3.6 Reviewing Models of Decision-Making in Context 
To make clearer the significance of emotional consensus and value sharing, I will 
review one of my previous case studies from the first chapter to examine the differences 
between the economic model of decision-making and the cognitive affective model of 
decision-making. I will also illustrate the different effects of the informed decision model and 
the shared decision-making model. Recall the case of Harold, the thirteen-year-old patient 
who was refusing treatment in order to keep his parents together at his bedside. 
In the cognitive-affective model of decision-making, Harolds decision will be affected 
by reason -to attain the goal of spending time with his family. In turn, Harold will have a 
negative attitude towards treatment, creating a negative valence relative to the decision to 
undergo treatment, believing treatment may shorten the time that Harolds family is all 
together. Harold may simultaneously have a positive attitude towards treatment because it 
will help prevent renal failure and death. Thus, Harold has both negative and positive 
valences relative to the decision to undergo treatment. Harolds doctor provides him with all 
of the relevant medical information as a doctor might in the informed decision-making 
model, and he reasons that refusing treatment may result in some more time spent together 
with his parents. Harold, thus, employs a type of means-end reasoning and decides to forego 
treatment in spite of his positive emotional valences toward treatment   
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Typically, acceptability and valence usually coincide so that the action that is most 
acceptable has the most emotional support as in Harolds case (Thagard and Kroon, 2006). 
That is, Harold decides to refuse treatment with the knowledge that it may not do him any 
good in the long run, and also may cause his own death and he maintains a negative valence 
towards his treatment option. In this analysis, the decision about whether to begin a treatment 
regimen is Harolds alone and the decision is affected by Harolds emotional responses to the 
treatment.   
In the context of shared decision-making Harold and his doctor both have emotional 
valences, positive and negative, attached to the treatment plan and together they must reach 
an emotional consensus as well as a factual consensus. Imagine that Harold and his doctor 
reach a factual consensus regarding the treatment options  there is only one available option 
left, and struggle towards an emotional consensus or approximation to consensus. The 
decision to undergo a treatment that compromises ones theoretically and practically rational 
goals is emotionally charged, and so too is the decision to prescribe a treatment to which 
patients have an aversion Emotional valences with respect to the represented option  take 
Cyclosporin A - are primarily communicated non-verbally. Harolds doctor maintains a 
positive emotional valence towards the treatment because he believes it is Harolds best 
option for potential recovery. Harold maintains a negative emotional valence towards the 
treatment because he believes it will not help him to achieve the goal of family togetherness. 
The goal of both Harold and his doctor is to arrive at an emotional consensus. Harolds 
doctor might tell Harold about another patient he had who was suffering from the same 
disease and who recovered fully after receiving the same treatment. Harolds doctor may go 
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on to add that it would be more fun for Harold to spend time with his parents outside of the 
hospital. Harolds doctor, in this instance, would be using an argument from analogy and 
empathy. In this scenario, it is not unreasonable to imagine that Harold would opt for the 
treatment  thus complying  given the information he received from his doctor that had both 
factual and emotional content.  
In the economic model of decision-making, Harolds strategies for preferences formation 
are to maximize his own utility and satisfaction. His preferences are believed to result from 
reasoned decision-making and preferences are largely unquestioned. If opting out of his 
treatment plan will maximize Harolds satisfaction and utility, then his non-compliant 
behaviours will be regarded as rational. It is more likely to be true that accepting treatment 
would maximize Harolds utility and satisfaction, because he would live longer. This model 
provides no way for Harold and his Doctor to see value in both of Harolds two options  
accept or reject treatment  because those values are linked to each of their own emotional 
reactions. In other words, there is a viable option for Harold that can be determined through 
some sort of utility calculus such that the option that undoubtedly maximizes Harolds 
satisfaction will be the only option he can rationally choose. In short, the problem of non-
compliance will arise when doctors expect patients to accept a treatment, but rejecting the 
treatment maximizes the expected utility outcome for the patient.  
3.7 Resolving the Problem 
I have so far suggested that the shared decision-making model is a good model of doctor-
patient relationships that can be improved, and I have suggested a way to improve it; by 
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incorporating the idea of emotional consensus, but I have not yet given any indication of how 
emotional consensus within the shared decision-making model will help to resolve the 
problem of rational intentional non-compliance. My view is that one of two things will occur 
when doctors and their patients reach a consensus about treatment that is both factual and 
emotional. Emotional consensus can help doctors and patients to share values, and two things 
will happen when doctors and patients share values: 
1. Doctors can share the values that their patients have  the same values that may 
cause rational intentional non-compliance, and they can opt to no longer prescribe 
treatment plans that they know their patients will be averse towards, or in extreme 
cases, they may recommend that their patients do nothing at all.  
2. Patients can share the values that their doctors have, and they will then come to 
recognize the importance of a treatment that they otherwise might not have seen 
and they will thus comply with their doctors recommendations. 
In the first case the problem of non-compliance is moot because non-compliance is judged by 
physician expectations, and in the first case the physician expects that patients have values 
that will cause them to not comply. Doctors may then recommend patients to opt in or out of 
treatment at their discretion, or more likely to seek out alternative treatments that do not have 
the same qualities towards which their patients are averse. These recommendations will be 
brought about through a discourse between doctors and patients that exposes patient values. 
It would be unethical for doctors to either withhold treatment options, or recommend 
inactivity on the part of patients without just cause. One benefit that the shared decision-
making model has is that it allows for dynamic views of treatment options. If doctors are 
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forced to prescribe treatments that conflict with their intuitions, they may have to seek out 
alternative methods of treatment. In seeking out alternative methods of treatments, doctors 
would be updating their knowledge, which, in turn, may have the result of producing better 
doctors. Or, at a minimum would produce doctors who are open to the idea of varying 
methods of treatment. Someone might object by saying that it is always unethical for doctors 
to prescribe that their patients make no motions towards bettering their health, to which I 
would respond that that may or may not be true but that this is not an investigation into the 
ethics of treatment. I accept that this view may be contested, but the relevant point is that 
sharing values through emotional consensus will help to overcome rational intentional non-
compliance. In the second case the problem of rational intentional non-compliance is moot 
because patients will be compliant if doctors are successful in communicating all relevant 
emotional and factual information.  
3.8 Normative Implications of the Shared Decision-Making Model and Future 
Work 
There are several different norms that develop from the shared decision-making model.  Thus 
the question of how to make compliance more medically successful brings to light many 
normative implications if the answer is within the context of shared decision-making. Daniel 
Hausman forcibly argues that,  
It is difficult to compare health states. One needs detailed information on their 
character and consequences and hence on the environment that so heavily 
determines these, and one needs to reflect long and hard on the weight one 
should place on different ways of valuing health statesIf health economists 
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cannot figure out how to compare health sates, lay respondents are going to 
have trouble, too (Hausman, 2006).  
Hausmans analysis of the status of health states highlights the view that laypeople are not 
suitably equipped to assess the value of health states, nor of their own health preferences. As 
such, an important element of successful compliance will be increased patient education. A 
consequence of the shared decision-making model of doctor patient relationships is that 
health education is a necessity. It would be unethical to implement a model of medical 
decision-making that requires patients to make decisions that they are, for the most part, 
incapable of making. For this reason, increased medical education for patients ought to be a 
priority. Prioritizing medical education is the first step towards making the shared decision-
making model of doctor patient relationships feasible as well as having better patients.  
Along with the necessity for better patients is the necessity for better doctors  that is, 
doctors who are educated not only in medicine, but also in the significance of emotional 
communication. In particular, developing a strong sense of empathy will aid doctors in 
reaching emotional consensus with their patients. The shared decision-making model, thus, 
not only requires that health education is emphasized and made accessible, but also that 
health education is changed in significant ways. Achieving the norms presented here present 
a partial and preliminary resolution to the problem of rational non-compliance. Training 
medical personnel in emotional communication, as well as educating regular people in 
medical critical thinking lays the foundation for a working shared decision-making process 
that involves emotional consensus. The improved shared decision-making model represents 




The principal goal of non-compliance research ought to be the reduction of the occurrence of 
non-compliant behaviours in practical healthcare. This goal has so far been largely un-met. 
There are a few reasons that non-compliance research has been unsuccessful to date. First 
and foremost, the problem has been approached from a broad understanding of non-
compliance and, in general terms, non-compliance has proven to be a complex, almost 
unmanageable problem. Second, suggestions have been made to improve existing doctor 
patient relationships as a way to combat non-compliant patients. However, these suggestions 
have, until now, been just that  suggestions, and vague suggestions at that. Finally, actual 
implementation of the suggestions for improvements to existing doctor-patient models has 
not been undertaken. 
In the first chapter, I developed a new understanding of intentional non-compliance, 
as being either rational or irrational, and argued that focusing on rational forms of intentional 
non-compliance provides insight into the idea of patient values. In the second chapter, I 
showed that vague suggestions to improve the traditional models of doctor patient 
relationships have failed because they are too vague to be implemented. I concluded the 
second chapter by arguing that a shared decision-making model is the best hope for 
implementation, and will also respond to some severe failings of the other models. In the 
third and final chapter, I argued for a shared decision making model that is built on the 
concept of emotional consensus and discussed the normative implications of this model as 
well as the normative implications of understanding non-compliance as rational. My view is 
a preliminary one, and I do not discuss implementation of the model or what implementation 
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would consist of. However, I have provided a discussion of the benefits of emotional 
consensus in decision-making as opposed to the deficiencies of the rational preference model 
of decision-making found in economics and philosophy. 
Non-compliance is a multi-faceted problem, and a solution to resolving this problem 
must match these various dimensions. I have identified one type of non-compliance, and 
have detailed a possible way to resolve the problem within the health care system. I say 
possible because a discussion of implementation of the shared decision-making model must 
still be undertaken. There is still much work that has to go in to resolving non-compliance, 
but up until this point possible solutions have been offered to resolve the general problem of 
non-compliance. Typically these suggestions are offered as a panacea to non-compliant 
behaviours. Unfortunately, non-compliance, in general, results from many interacting 
variables and resolving non-compliance, in general, is difficult if not impossible. Non-
compliance, I have argued, can be broken down into manageable forms. One of these forms 
is rational intentional non-compliance. Most non-compliant behaviours that are rational and 
intentional are caused by certain patient values. The values that contribute to non-compliant 
behaviour override patients value of health, causing doctors and patients to come into 
conflict with regards to treatment expectations.  Sharing values by way of emotional 
consensus will help to rid the doctor-patient relationship of this conflict, and in so-doing, rid 
the doctor-patient relationship of rational intentional non-compliance.   
1 These 85 patients represent one-third of the renal transplant patients at the hospital, while 
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